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Actual Knowledge of Direct Patent Infringement is
Required for Induced Infringement: Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.
PATENT LAW-INDUCED INFRINGEMENT-INTENT-
WILLFUL BLINDNESS-The United States Supreme Court held
that induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) re-
quires knowledge that the induced acts would result in the direct
infringement of a patent and that the knowledge of the accused
infringer could be established through either actual knowledge or
by applying the doctrine of willful blindness to the accused in-
fringer's conduct.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
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I. THE FACTS OF GLOBAL-TECH
The French company SEB S.A. ("SEB") developed a novel deep
fryer, obtaining U.S. patent protection for its invention in 1991.'
SEB's deep fryer was cool to the touch, making it safe and easy for
use by consumers in the home, resulting in the fryer's commercial
success.2 Sunbeam Products, Inc. ("Sunbeam") sought to develop a
rival product and commissioned petitioner Pentalpha Enterprises,
Ltd. ("Pentalpha")' to design a deep fryer to certain specifications.4
To develop the competing product, Pentalpha purchased an SEB
fryer in Hong Kong and proceeded to copy the functional aspects of
its design.5 The SEB fryer purchased by Pentalpha in Hong Kong
did not possess the markings commonly used in the United States
that indicate the U.S. patents protecting the product.6
Pentalpha sought to ascertain whether it was able to manufac-
ture the product without infringing any U.S. patents, and it en-
gaged patent attorneys to conduct a freedom-to-use analysis.7
Pentalpha did not, however, inform its patent counsel that it co-
pied SEB's product in developing its deep fryer.8 During its free-
dom-to-use analysis, Pentalpha's counsel attempted to identify
any U.S. patents that could block the manufacturing and sale of
the fryer, but they failed to identify SEB's patent.9 Pentalpha's
counsel issued an opinion letter to Pentalpha, advising that it was
able to manufacture its deep fryer without concern of infringing
any U.S. patents that it could identify.'1
In 1997, Pentalpha began selling its deep fryer to Sunbeam,
who, in turn, sold the product in the United States." Because of
lower production costs, Sunbeam captured market share from
SEB. 12 In March 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam for infringement of its
patent, and Sunbeam subsequently informed Pentalpha of the
1. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063-64 (2011).
2. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
3. Id. at 2064. Pentalpha is a Hong Kong-based, wholly-owned subsidiary of Global-




7. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064. A freedom-to-use analysis evaluates whether a





12. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064.
660 Vol. 50
Summer 2012 Global-Tech Appliances v. SEB
lawsuit. 3 In spite of the suit, Pentalpha continued to market and
sell the deep fryer to other third parties, who, in turn, also sold
them in the United States.14
The lawsuit between SEB and Sunbeam settled, and SEB sub-
sequently sued Pentalpha for patent infringement, asserting that
Pentalpha infringed SEB's patent both directly under 35 U.S.C. §
271(a) by selling and offering to sell its deep fryer and under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) by actively inducing others to infringe through
their sales of the infringing deep fryers in the United States."
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF GLOBAL-TECH
Following a five-day trial, a jury found that Pentalpha directly
infringed SEB's patent under § 271(a), induced infringement un-
der § 271(b), and further found that Pentalpha's infringement was
willful. 6 Pentalpha sought a new trial or alternatively, a judg-
ment as a matter of law, asserting that there was insufficient evi-
dence for the jury to conclude that Pentalpha's conduct constituted
induced infringement under § 271(b).17 Pentalpha specifically ar-
gued that its ignorance of SEB's patent shielded it from the find-
ing of induced infringement. 8
The trial court denied Pentalpha's post-trial motions and Pen-
talpha appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.9 In affirming the district court's decision, the
Federal Circuit found that induced infringement under § 271(b)
requires that the alleged infringer knew or should have known
that its actions would infringe a patent of which it was aware.2 °
Even though SEB presented no direct evidence at trial that Pen-
talpha was actually aware of SEB's patent, the Federal Circuit
13. Id.
14. Id. Pentalpha's other clients included Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward &
Co. Id.
15. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). The three provisions of this statute under consideration
here (i.e., 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), (b), (c)) were codified in 1952. Id. at 2065-66 (quoting Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485-86 n.6 (1964)). Section
271(a) was amended in 1994 to include additional elements not at issue here. The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)).
16. Id.
17. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2064 (citing SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc), affd sub nom. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct.
2060 (2011)).
20. Id. at 2064-65.
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held that "Pentalpha deliberately disregarded" the possibility that
SEB held patent protection for its deep fryers.2' The Federal Cir-
cuit held that Pentalpha's disregard constituted a form of actual
knowledge and affirmed the judgment.22 Upon Pentalpha's peti-
tion, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.23
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT OPINION IN GLOBAL-
TECH
A. Justice Alito's Majority Opinion
The issue confronted by the Court was whether demonstrating
induced infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) re-
quires proof that the accused party knew that the acts in question
constitute patent infringement.24  Justice Alito, writing for the
Court,25 began his analysis with the text of § 271(b), which reads
in total: "[wihoever actively induces infringement of a patent
shall be liable as an infringer."26 In construing the statute, the
Court defined "induce" as "' [t] o lead on; to influence; to prevail on;
to move by persuasion or influence' and noted that the use of the
term "actively" implied that the inducing includes taking positive
steps to bring about the infringing activity, thus inferring a re-
quirement of intent.27 The Court noted that the text of § 271(b) is
ambiguous in that it is not clear whether the accused must induce
a third party to infringe a patent of which the inducer is aware or,
instead, could simply knowingly cause the third party to under-
take actions that happen to result in infringement of an unknown
21patent.
To resolve the ambiguity, the Court analyzed earlier case law
that interpreted the relevant patent statutes.29 Section 271 was
codified in the Patent Act of 1952 ("the Patent Act").3" The Patent
Act classifies direct infringement in § 271(a) as the unauthorized
21. Id. at 2065 (citing Montgomery Ward, 594 F.3d at 1377).
22. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065 (citing Montgomery Ward, 594 F.3d at 1377).
23. Id. (citation omitted).
24. Id. at 2063.
25. Id. Justice Alito was joined by Roberts, C.J. and Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ. Id.
26. Id. at 2065 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010)).
27. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1269 (2d ed. 1945)).
28. Id.
29. Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271).
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making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing of a patented
invention. 31 The Patent Act also established two separate causes
of action for indirect infringement of a patent by splitting the tra-
ditional patent law concept of "contributory infringement" into (1)
induced infringement under § 271(b) and (2) contributory in-
fringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 32 Unlike induced infringe-
ment, contributory infringement under § 271(c) requires that the
accused infringer provide a non-patented component of a patented
invention to a third party who incorporates that component into a
patented invention, thus contributing to the third party's in-
fringement of the patented invention.33 In undertaking its analy-
sis, the Court noted that the pre-1952 case law more commonly
evaluated cases arising under contributory infringement as de-
fined in § 271(c) and initially sought direction from those cases for
insight into what kind of awareness was required by the accused
infringer.34
The pre-1952 decisions, however, proved to be of limited utility
in resolving the issue, with cases providing support for both posi-
tions.3' For instance, then-Judge Taft stated that "it was 'well
settled that where one makes and sells one element of a combina-
tion covered by a patent with the intention and for the purpose of
bringing about its use in such a combination he is guilty of contri-
butory infringement,"' indicating that it was sufficient that the
seller of a component merely intended that part be used in a com-
bination that happened to infringe.36 Alternatively, the Supreme
Court stated in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. that if the accused parties
knew of the existence of the patent and that the third party made
the infringing product with the intent of having that product used,
the accused party was liable for assisting in patent infringement.37
Consistent with that interpretation, the majority in Global-Tech
noted the Court's earlier analysis of the related concept of contri-
butory infringement of copyrights in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. where it stated that the "inducement
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
32. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066-67 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b),(c)).
33. Id. at 2066.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th
Cir. 1897)).
37. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 (citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 33 (1912),




rule ... premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct.""
Finding both the statutory language and the pre-1952 case law
regarding traditional contributory infringement to be equivocal,
the Court considered post-1952 decisions regarding contributory
infringement under § 271(c). 9 In Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), the Court considered the
issue of the intent required in establishing contributory infringe-
ment under § 271(c), which contains the same ambiguity that is
present in § 271(b)." The majority in Aro H found that to be liable
for contributory patent infringement, the accused "must know that
the combination for which his component was especially designed
was both patented and infringing."4' In Aro H, the divided Court's
majority held that knowledge of the patent was needed.42 While
noting that four justices disagreed with that conclusion, Justice
Alito's opinion cited with approval to the analysis that described
the holding in Aro H as "'a fixture in the law of contributory in-
fringement under [§1 271(c)."4'3 In the present case, Justice Alito
also observed that Congress had not altered the intent require-
ment for contributory infringement under § 271(c) articulated in
Aro H in the more than fifty years since that case was decided."
Deferring to the "special force" of stare decisis as applied to issues
of statutory interpretation, the Court held that contributory in-
fringement under § 271(c) requires knowledge of the infringed pa-
tent.45
Justice Alito then returned to the fact that the two types of in-
fringement codified in 1952 in § 271(b) and § 271(c) (i.e., induced
and contributory infringement, respectively) arose from the same
pre-1952 concept of "contributory infringement.""6 Noting that
both sections of the Patent Act possessed the same ambiguity and
had the same pre-1952 origins, the Court concluded that both sec-
38. Id. at 2066-67 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S.
913, 937 (2005)).
39. Id. at 2067.
40. Id. (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476,
488 (1964) (plurality)).
41. Id.
42. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067 (internal citations omitted).
43. Id. at 2068 (citing 5 R. Carl Moy, Inducing Infringement; Section 271(b)-Required Know-
ledge and Intent, in MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:20 (4th ed. 2009)).
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008)).
46. Id. at 2067-68.
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tions have the same requirements for intent of the infringer. 7 Ac-
cordingly, the majority held that induced infringement under §
271(b) requires that the accused infringer know that the induced
acts would infringe a patent.48
The Court then focused on how to establish the element of ac-
tual knowledge of an infringed patent by importing the doctrine of
willful blindness from criminal law.49 The concept of willful blind-
ness was not previously applied in patent law cases, and accor-
dingly, the Court sought direction from criminal law.' ° Similar to
induced infringement under § 271(b), many criminal laws include
the requirement that the accused acted knowingly or willfully in
committing the crime."' Under these laws, defendants may not be
absolved from guilt "by deliberately shielding themselves from
clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances."52 Justice Alito also noted that defendants "who
know enough to blind themselves to direct proof of critical facts, in
effect, have actual knowledge of those facts."53 The majority also
cited to the Model Penal Code, where the knowledge of a fact in-
cludes "a situation in which 'a person is aware of a high probabili-
ty of [the fact's] existence, unless he actually believes that it does
not exist.' 54 The Court noted the broad endorsement of the con-
cept of using willful blindness as a substitute for actual knowledge
of a fact by both the Supreme Court as well as nearly every United
States Court of Appeals, and accordingly applied it to induced in-
fringement under § 271(b)."
The Court defined the doctrine of willful blindness as having
two requirements: "(1) the defendant must subjectively believe
that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the de-
fendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that
fact."56 By satisfying both of these prongs, an accused infringer
"can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts." 7





52. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69.
53. Id. at 2069 (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976)).
54. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) note on status of section (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962)).
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 2070 (internal citations omitted).
57. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070-71 (internal citations omitted).
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Using these standards, the Court criticized the Federal Circuit
below on two grounds for employing an improper test to establish
knowledge of an infringed patent." First, the Federal Circuit's
more permissive test allowed a finding of knowledge of an in-
fringed patent when there is a "known risk" (as opposed to a high
probability) that the induced acts are infringing. 9 Second, the
Federal Circuit required simply "deliberate indifference," rather
than active efforts by an accused to avoid learning of the in-
fringement." Even though the Federal Circuit used an inappro-
priate test for determining actual knowledge, the majority none-
theless concluded that Pentalpha's conduct here would constitute
willful blindness "to the infringing nature of the sales it encour-
aged Sunbeam to make.""
The Court found that Pentalpha's conduct would satisfy its new-
ly identified standard for willful blindness, thereby establishing
that Pentalpha had actual knowledge of the infringed patent.62
The Court noted that Pentalpha conducted a market search and
was aware of the commercial success of SEB's deep fryer.63 Fur-
ther, Justice Alito inferred that the deliberate copying of the subs-
tantive portions of SEB's deep fryer evidenced Pentalpha's belief
that it "embodied advanced technology."64 The Court also found
that Pentalpha's copying of a foreign version of SEB's deep fryer
reflected a deliberate attempt to avoid learning of any United
States patent coverage for SEB's deep fryer.6" Pentalpha was well
aware that foreign products do not typically indicate U.S. patents
covering the product, thus it could avoid any direct knowledge of
any such patents by using a foreign product.66 Finally, the Court
found Pentalpha's decision not to inform its patent counsel that it
had copied SEB's deep fryer to be "[e]ven more telling."6" The ma-
jority could not "fathom what motive [Pentalpha's engineer] could
have had for withholding this information other than to manufac-
58. Id. at 2071.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (internal citations omitted).





67. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071.
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ture a claim of plausible deniability in the event that [Pentalphal
was later accused of patent infringement."8
The Court found that the evidence was adequate for the jury to
conclude that Pentalpha thought that there was a high probability
that a U.S. patent covered SEB's deep fryer and that deliberate
steps were taken by Pentalpha to avoid knowledge of those pa-
tents.69 On that basis, the jury could reasonably have found that
Pentalpha had willfully blinded itself to the infringement of SEB's
patent by the sales of its deep fryers in the United States.70 The
Court thus affirmed the jury's finding that Pentalpha infringed
SEB's patent under a theory of induced infringement under §
271(b).7'
B. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
While Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that both §§
271(b) and 271(c) must be read to require that the accused in-
fringer know that the induced acts constitute patent infringement,
he dissented from the majority's application and analysis of willful
blindness.72 Specifically, the dissent argued that substituting will-
ful blindness for the actual knowledge required for a showing of
infringement under § 271(b) is inappropriate." Justice Kennedy
asserted that "[t] he alleged inducer who believes a device is nonin-
fringing cannot be said to know otherwise. "7  Instead, Justice
Kennedy would have left consideration of the facts presented at
trial to the jury, which he felt is best placed to make the inference
of actual knowledge on the part of the defendant.75
Justice Kennedy further objected to the majority's seeming en-
dorsement of the application of the doctrine of willful blindness in
all federal criminal cases involving knowledge.76 Justice Kennedy
particularly objected to such an extension on the basis of the case
at bar, a civil case in which no briefing or argument was received
on that point from the criminal defense bar.77
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2072.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2073.
76. Id.
77. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2073 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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IV. HISTORY OF INDUCED INFRINGEMENT
A. Patent Infringement Under the Patent Act of 1952
The Constitution allows Congress "[t]o promote the [p1rogress of
[sicience and useful [a]rts by securing for limited [t]imes to
[aluthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [rlight to their respective
[w]ritings and [dliscoveries. " Finding its basis in that clause, the
modern U.S. patent system allows inventors to obtain a limited-
duration monopoly for novel and non-obvious inventions.79
Before passage of the Patent Act of 1952, patent infringement
existed as a judicially created tort which was divided into two cat-
egories." Common law direct infringement was the unauthorized
making, using, or selling of the invention covered by the patent."'
Indirect infringement was termed "contributory infringement" and
resulted when the accused infringer displayed behavior that
equitably established him as an infringer, even if he or she did not
directly infringe.82
The codification achieved by the Patent Act did not substantive-
ly change the scope of those judicially created doctrines, but strati-
fied them into separate causes of action.8" Under § 271(a), an in-
ventor may exclude others from making, using, offering to sell,
selling, or importing into the United States the patented invention
during the term of a U.S. patent.84 Any party that specifically per-
forms any of these steps without authorization of the inventor is
liable for the tort of direct patent infringement, regardless of lack
of intent to infringe the patent.8" The Patent Act also identifies
causes of action for indirect infringement through the assisting or
aiding of a third party in direct infringement of the patent.86 Two
distinct types of indirect infringement are delineated in the Patent
Act: contributory infringement and inducing infringement, both of
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2010). The term of a patent is generally twenty years from
its filing date. Id. § 154(a)(2).
80. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
81. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (citations omitted).
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §
533(a), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) expanded the definition of infringement to include offers to
sell patent inventions and the importation of patent inventions into the United States, and
became effective as of January 1, 1996. Id.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
86. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (citations omitted).
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which arose from the common law tort of "contributory infringe-
ment."8' Modern contributory infringement occurs when one:
[Slells . . . a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or material or apparatus for use
in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part
of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent..
* shall be liable as a contributory infringer.8
Additionally, the infringer must know that his or her contribution
will be used in the infringing device.89
Inducing infringement captures all other types of indirect in-
fringement and is more broadly defined as "[wihoever actively in-
duces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." ° In
contrast to contributory infringement, the intent or knowledge of
the infringing party is not specifically mentioned in the statute as
an element of induced infringement, though the term "actively"
has been routinely interpreted to include some aspect of intent or
knowledge on the part of the infringer.9' The legislative history of
§ 271(b) harkens to criminal law and speaks of the inducer as one
who "aids and abets" an infringer in direct infringement of a pa-
tent.92 Giles Rich (later Judge Rich of the Federal Circuit) stated
in 1952 that § 271(b) is "inten[ded] to hold liable the mastermind
who plans the whole infringement and sits back and watches it
happen, somehow managing himself to avoid" committing direct
infringement.93
87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b), (c).
88. Id. § 271(c) (emphasis added).
89. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (internal citations omitted).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).
91. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("Although § 271(b) does not use the word 'knowingly,' this court has uniformly imposed
such a knowledge requirement." (citations omitted)); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco,
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Although section 271(b) does not use the word
'knowing,' the case law and legislative history uniformly assert such a requirement." (cita-
tion omitted)).
92. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 8 (1952) ("Paragraph (b) recites in broad terms
that one [who] aids and abets an infringement is likewise an infringer.").
93. Giles S. Rich, Address of Giles S. Rich, Nov. 6, 1952, reprinted in 3 J. FED. CIR.
HIsT. Soc'y 103, 113 (2009). Judge Rich was appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("CCPA"; the precursor to the modern Federal Circuit, which was established in
1982) by President Eisenhower in 1956. F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW
24 (5th ed. 2011). Prior to his appointment to the CCPA, Judge Rich was a member of a
two-person committee with Chief Patent Examiner Pasquale J. ("P.J.") Federico, which
drafted the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at 24-25.
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B. Intent Required for Induced Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. §
271(b)
While such manipulative schemes are certainly within the scope
of induced infringement, defining the full range of actions and
state of mind required by the inducer proved elusive.94 As a pre-
liminary matter, the Federal Circuit held that the minimum re-
quirement to establish that infringement was actively induced is a
showing that the accused infringer engages in activities that are
later determined to have infringed a patent directly and that the
infringer intended those acts to take place.95 The actual full scope
of the intent that was required for inducing infringement, howev-
er, was not so clear.96 As noted above, the statutory language is
ambiguous: does an alleged infringer need to only intend to com-
mit acts that are eventually shown to be infringement, or instead,
does the accused infringer need to be aware of possible infringe-
ment and intend those acts to constitute infringement?9
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit notably addressed
these issues in Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb.9" There, Hew-
lett-Packard appealed from a grant for summary judgment by the
district court that Bausch & Lomb had not actively induced in-
fringement of Hewlett-Packard's patent.99 The Federal Circuit
recognized the statutory ambiguity regarding the level of know-
ledge or intent that is required to establish induced infringement
under § 271(b).0 ° Judge Rich, writing for the court, noted the
common law origins of both 271(b) and 271(c) in the pre-1952 "con-
tributory infringement" cause of action.' The court explored pre-
1952 case law specifically evaluating the role of intent in "contri-
94. See DONALD A. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5115.40 (2011).
95. See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int'l., Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1379-80
(Fed. Cir. 2005); MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
96. Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 238
(2005) ("While the specific intent requirement is well-established in the law, the Federal
Circuit has been unable to agree on precisely what it is that a defendant must intend."
(internal citations omitted)).
97. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 (2011).
98. 909 F.2d 1464, 1468-70 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Judge Rich (one of the authors of the 1952
Patent Act) wrote for the court. See Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1465.
99. Id. at 1466. The invention at issue in Hewlett-Packard involved X-Y plotters used
to create a two-dimensional plot. Id.
100. Id. at 1468.
101. Id.
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butory infringement" and found that those decisions required in-
tent on the part of the accused infringer to cause infringement.'1 '
The Federal Circuit also noted that contributory infringement un-
der § 271(c) arose from the same common law origins as § 271(b)
and required only proof of a defendant's "knowledge, not intent,
that his activity cause infringement."'' Accordingly, the court
held that "proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute
the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active in-
ducement." °4 Bausch & Lomb did not display even that modicum
of requisite intent and Hewlett-Packard's challenge failed.0
Some courts and commentators have interpreted the Federal
Circuit's analysis in Hewlett-Packard to require only that the ac-
cused infringer intend to cause his or her actions to be liable for
induced patent infringement. 10 6 In contrast, other courts have in-
terpreted "actively" as requiring more than just the active pursuit
by the alleged infringer."7 For example, in Manville v. Paramount
Systems, the Federal Circuit stated that "lilt must be established
that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage anoth-
er's infringement and not merely that the defendant had know-
ledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement."' °5 In light of
these conflicting decisions, the Federal Circuit frankly stated in
102. Id. at 1469 (citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1912); Thomson-
Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897); Tubular Rivet &
Stud Co. v. O'Brien, 93 F. 200, 202-05 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898)).
103. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469 (citing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co. (Aro I), 377 U.S. 476, 485-86 (1964) (plurality)).
104. Id. (citation omitted).
105. See id. at 1469-70.
106. Lemley, supra note 96, at 238-39 ("The Hewlett-Packard court did not require that
the defendant have any awareness of the patent, much less intend to infringe it, but simply
that it intend to encourage the conduct that ultimately turned out to be infringing." (inter-
nal citations omitted)). See also SEB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 412 F. Supp. 2d 336, 344
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation omitted).
107. See, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (a plain-
tiff must prove that once the alleged infringer knew of the patent, he or she also "actively
and knowingly aidledl and abet[ted] another's direct infringement."); Sims v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1217 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir.
1979) ("It appears ... that ... inducement requires acts which cause, urge, encourage or
aid another to infringe and knowledge by the inducer that infringement is likely.").
108. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553 ("The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged
infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his
actions would induce actual infringements.").
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2005 that there was a "lack of clarity" surrounding the intent re-
quired to prove induced infringement."°9
The Federal Circuit sat en banc to resolve the conflicting prece-
dents in DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Co. '1o There, DSU sued
JMS for direct, contributory, and inducing infringement of DSU's
patent."' The jury instructions regarding induced infringement
stated that there must be "proof that the defendant [JMS] kno-
wingly induced infringement with the intent to encourage the in-
fringement.., and [JMS] must have known or should have known
than [sic] its action would cause the direct infringement." 112 DSU
objected to that instruction on the basis that it did not comport
with the standard articulated in Hewlett-Packard-namely, proof
of intent to cause infringing acts is all that is required to establish
inducement of infringement."' The en banc panel rejected DSU's
argument, finding that "inducement requires evidence of culpable
conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not mere-
ly that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's activi-
ties.
," 4
C. Manner of Establishing Intent Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
Even where courts hold that knowledge of the infringing nature
of the acts is required, confusion surrounds how the requisite in-
tent may be established. Some courts hold that active inducement
requires a plaintiff to establish that an alleged inducing infringer
"knew or should have known" that their actions would induce ac-
tual infringement."' Other courts require that the defendant act
with either actual or constructive knowledge that it was inducing
109. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (in-
ternal quotation omitted)), vacated on other grounds, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
110. DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed Cir. 2006) (en banc).
Section III.B of the decision was the only section considered en banc. DSU, 471 F.3d at
1304.
111. Id. at 1297. The invention at issue in DSU was a guarded, winged-needle assem-
bly. Id.
112. Id. at 1305 (citation omitted).
113. Id. at 1305 n.2 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464,
1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
114. Id. at 1306 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 936 (2005); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
115. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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infringement of a valid patent. 116  Still other courts require that
the accused infringer be aware of the specific patent that would be
infringed.117 The Federal Circuit, however, has ruled out the idea
that "mere knowledge of possible infringement by others" amounts
to inducement to infringe."8 Additionally, commentators have
stated that the level of intent required for induced infringement is
"certainly not mere willful blindness."19 In sum, courts have un-
iformly ascribed some form of knowledge and intent to their inter-
pretation of induced infringement under § 271(b), though the spe-
cific type of intent and how it may be established was unclear.'2 °
V. IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN GLOBAL-TECH
The Supreme Court in Global-Tech clearly articulated the na-
ture of the intent required for finding induced infringement under
§ 271(b) and identified a "willful blindness" standard to establish
the accused infringer's state of mind. The holding on the nature of
the intent would have been more appropriately supported by cita-
tion to the relevant precedent from the Federal Circuit. The ap-
plication of the criminal doctrine of willful blindness to this civil
matter, however, unnecessarily blended civil and criminal stan-
dards and could have been more artfully addressed by relying on
precedent from the Federal Circuit.
A. Intent Required for Induced Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. §
271(b)
The Supreme Court correctly concluded that a party accused of
infringement under § 271(b) must possess knowledge that the in-
duced acts constitute patent infringement. The Court, however,
omitted discussion of the most relevant precedent and conducted
an unnecessary analysis of the intent required to establish in-
duced infringement.
While its analysis began appropriately with a consideration of
the statutory language, the Supreme Court inexplicably leapt to
116. See Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 638, 657 (D. Del.
2004), affid in part, vacated in part, 406 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
117. See DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304 ("The requirement that the alleged infringer knew or
should have known his actions would induce actual infringement necessarily includes the
requirement that he or she knew of the patent." (citing Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H.
Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1364 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006))).
118. Warner-Lambert, 316 F.3d at 1364 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 554).
119. Lemley, supra note 96, at 237 (citation omitted).
120. See, e.g., id.; see also CHISUM, supra note 94.
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case law that was decided prior to the codification of the Patent
Act of 1952 and, therefore, addressed a non-statutory cause of ac-
tion. '2 In doing so, the Court disregarded fifty-nine years of
precedent that includes principles already articulated by the Fed-
eral Circuit and its predecessor courts, derived from consideration
of the exact statute at issue here, namely § 271(b). Similarly, the
Court need not have leaned so heavily on the principles of copy-
right law articulated in Grokster or on the parallels to contributo-
ry patent infringement under § 271(c) discussed in Aro H. Federal
Circuit decisions provide the most relevant and carefully consi-
dered precedent for consideration of the patent statute of § 271(b),
and they should not have been ignored.
Turning to that precedent, the issue of whether the accused par-
ty was required to know that the induced acts constitute direct
patent infringement was well settled by the Federal Circuit. As
noted above, an en banc Federal Circuit held in DSU that both
knowledge of the acts that induced the infringement and know-
ledge that the acts constituted direct infringement were required
to demonstrate induced infringement."' This legal standard did
not require clarification by the Supreme Court.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit, in Hewlett Packard, already
undertook the historical analysis and parallels between the intent
components of §§ 271(b) and 271(c).' There, Judge Rich reviewed
the history of § 271(b) and evaluated the pre-1952 case law, with
an emphasis on evaluating the intent component of the cause of
action. 24 In this case, the oversight of the Court in ignoring Hew-
lett Packard is glaring. To the degree that the Hewlett Packard
decision was misinterpreted as requiring only the intent to cause
the action by the third party (rather than the intent to cause in-
fringement), the Federal Circuit in DSU resolved that conflict.'2
121. While the common law "contributory infringement" was split into contributory and
induced infringement by the Patent Act without changing its scope, decisions relating to
the statute at issue here (i.e., 271(b)) are per se more relevant, as they consider the specific
statutory language. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
122. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F. 2d 544, 553
(Fed. Cir. 1990)).
123. Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1468-69.
124. As one of the drafters of the Patent Act and a judge on the Federal Circuit, Judge
Rich is singularly qualified to conduct a discussion of induced infringement under § 271(b).
KIEFF, supra note 93, at 24.
125. Beyond Hewlett Packard and DSU, Federal Circuit decisions regarding the intent
required under § 271(b) are legion. See, e.g., Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d
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In sum, the Court should have simply adopted the previously arti-
culated standard that was carefully considered and resolved en
banc by the Federal Circuit. The Court's holding regarding intent
reflects a redundant effort and amounts to a waste of judicial re-
sources.
The Supreme Court's omission of relevant Federal Circuit
precedent is peculiar in light of the amicus briefs before the Court.
The relevant precedent (including Hewlett Packard and DSU) was
cited and extensively discussed in the amicus curiae brief submit-
ted by the Federal Circuit Bar Association ("FCBA"). 126 That brief
was submitted on behalf of neither party, but was aimed only at
"seeking a correct interpretation of the patent laws."12' The FCBA
noted that the DSU court "pronounced that this Court's 'purpose-
ful, culpable expression and conduct' standard applied to the pa-
tent context" and further offered that the Court need "look no fur-
ther than its own precedent-as approvingly applied to patent law
by the Federal Circuit en banc" to reach this conclusion.'28 Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court overlooked this well-directed guid-
ance.
B. Manner of Establishing Intent Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)
The second issue before the Court was how the requisite know-
ledge that the induced infringement under § 271(b) may be estab-
lished.'29 Justice Kennedy's dissent appropriately criticizes the
majority's approach to resolving this issue. In this civil case, the
Court veered haphazardly into criminal law and imported the
"well established" doctrine of willful blindness." This detour was
unneeded and inappropriate. Outside of its application in specia-
683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377-78
(Fed. Cir. 2005); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[Miere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to inducement;
specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven." (citing Manville, 917
F.2d at 553)); Manville, 917 F.2d at 553-54; Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850
F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Neither the majority nor dissenting opinion cites any of
these cases.
126. The Federal Circuit Bar Association is a national bar association whose members
either practice before the Federal Circuit or have an interest in the decisions of that court.
Brief for Federal Circuit Bar Ass'n in Support of Neither Party at 1, Global-Tech Ap-
pliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A_, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (No. 10-6) [hereinafter Brief for FCBA.
127. Id. at 1-2.
128. Id. at 5 (citing DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed Cir. 2006)
(en banc); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)).




lized areas of law, Global-Tech marks the Supreme Court's first
detailed discussion of the general use of willful blindness.' Nu-
merous questions swirled around this "well-established" doctrine,
and guidance from the Supreme Court was long awaited by the
criminal bar.'32 A decision concerning patent infringement was an
odd vessel to deliver that guidance.
In discussing willful blindness, the Court utilized criminal cases
and the Model Penal Code to formulate the elements of willful
blindness as "(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that
there is a high probability that a fact exists, and (2) the defendant
must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact."'33
Though based on a synthesis of previous decisions, this particular
definition creates a new framework for evaluating willful blind-
ness, both in criminal and civil proceedings.' The Court even-
tually confessed that it "[could] see no reason why the doctrine
should not apply in civil lawsuits ..."1"
The reasons the majority found so difficult to discern are mani-
fold. As Justice Kennedy warned, the Supreme Court "appears to
endorse the willful blindness doctrine here for all federal criminal
cases involving knowledge."'36 The implications of this recharacte-
rization of criminal knowledge are likely to reverberate through-
out the federal criminal bar.137 Moreover, the Court undertook this
131. Timothy P. O'Toole, Patently Unusual: How a Recent Supreme Court Patent Deci-
sion Alters the Landscape for Proving Criminal Knowledge, WESTLAW J. WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME, Sept. 2011, at 1, 2. The concept of willful blindness has also been applied in prose-
cutions under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. See Frans J. Von Kaenel, Willful
Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the Money Laundering
Control Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1189 (1993). Willful blindness also arises in criminal viola-
tions of tax laws. See Mark D. Yochum, Cheek is Chic. Ignorance of the Law is an Excuse
for Tax Crimes-A Fashion that Does Not Wear Well, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 249 (1993). Finally,
willful blindness was discussed by Justice Breyer for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009),
which makes it a crime to "knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization." See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2740
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Shawn D. Rodriguez, Caging Careless Birds: Ex-
amining Dangers Posed by the Willful Blindness Doctrine in the War on Terror, 30 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 691 (2008).
132. O'Toole, supra note 131, at 2 ("Thus, there were considerable disputes about the
definition of willful blindness, the requisite foundation, whether it was synonymous with
recklessness and whether giving a properly worded willful-blindness instruction can be
reversible error." (internal citations omitted)).
133. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
134. O'Toole, supra note 131, at 3.
135. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069.
136. Id. at 2073.
137. Brian W. Walsh, The Supreme Court's Willful Blindness Doctrine Opens the Door to
More Wrongful Criminal Convictions, WEBMEMO (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.), June 30,
2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.heritage.orgResearch/Reports/2011/06/The-Supreme-
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significant shift without any input from those whom it affects.
Justice Kennedy correctly noted that the Court received no brief-
ing on the interpretation of the willful blindness doctrine from the
criminal bar.3' The Court should not have taken this significant
step so rashly.
Additionally, the Court hedges application of its two-part test
for willful blindness by saying a willfully blind defendant "can al-
most be said to have actually known the critical facts" and finding
that this satisfied the actual knowledge requirement for induced
infringement, articulated earlier in the decision. 39 Justice Kenne-
dy's criticism that "[tlhe alleged inducer who believes a device is
noninfringing cannot be said to know otherwise" is again appro-
priate.'4 ° The Supreme Court's application of the doctrine of will-
ful blindness for induced infringement creates an unnecessary and
awkward tension for both civil and criminal federal proceedings in
which willful blindness is relevant.
The Supreme Court could have avoided both that tension and
the repercussions for the federal criminal bar by tapping into more
appropriate precedent. For example, the Federal Circuit has re-
peatedly considered the mechanism for establishing willful direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and those standards would
have been aptly applied here. Willful infringement under § 271(a)
occurs where "a potential infringer has actual notice of another's
patent rights" and disregards those rights by infringing the pa-
tent.' The "actual notice" component of willful direct infringe-
ment under § 271(a) is entirely analogous to the "knowledge that
the induced acts constitute patent infringement" that the Court
held to be required for induced infringement under its statutory
neighbor, § 271(b).
In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the Federal Circuit extensive-
ly reviewed case law on the meaning of willfulness as a statutory
condition for civil liability.4 2 The Federal Circuit cited to the Su-
preme Court decision of Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,
where assessment of punitive damages in a civil case was consi-
Courts-Willful-Blindness-Doctrine-Opens-the-Door-t-More-Wrongful-Criminal-
Convictions.
138. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2073.
139. Id. at 2070-71, 2072 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
141. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed.
Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
142. 497 F.3d at 1370-72 (citations omitted).
Summer 2012 677
Duquesne Law Review
dered.'4 In that case, the Court found that the standard civil
usage of "willful" included reckless behavior and, therefore,
adopted a definition of willfulness that included not only actual
knowledge, but also reckless disregard.144 The Federal Circuit ap-
plied this analysis to willful infringement and held that "to estab-
lish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent."14 5 Once the objective standard is satisfied, the patentee
must also establish that the risk of infringement "was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the ac-
cused infringer."'46
The Federal Circuit employed a similar analysis for assessing
induced infringement under § 271(b) in Manville, where it stated
that "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged
infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or
should have known his actions would induce actual infringe-
ments."'47 In DSU, the concurring opinion noted that § 271(b) thus
allows proving induced infringement through either actual or con-
structive knowledge.'48 These standards developed in considera-
tion of the civil torts of patent infringement are far preferable to
the criminal law doctrine of willful blindness adopted by the Court
in Global-Tech.14 ' At the very least, the Court could have applied
the common law doctrines that accompany the jurisprudence of
intentional torts, rather than obfuscate the matter entirely by con-
founding criminal mens rea with the intent required in these
kinds of civil action.
Furthermore, while the stringent standard of willful blindness
is well suited for criminal cases (where the burden for conviction is
beyond a reasonable doubt), its application to claims of patent in-
fringement (where the burden is a mere preponderance of the evi-
dence) is wholly inappropriate. 0 Forcing a plaintiff to establish
143. Id. at 1370 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. V. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56-57 (2007)).
144. Safeco, 551 U.S. at 68-69 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984)).
145. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (citing Safeco, 551 U.S. at 69).
146. Id.
147. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see
also DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing
Manville with approval).
148. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1311 (Michel, C.J. & Mayer, J., concurring).
149. See Brief for FCBA, supra note 126, at 17-19 (urging the adoption of the analytical
framework set forth in the objective test for willful infringement as set forth in Seagate).
150. KIEFF, supra note 93, at 819.
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the intent of the accused infringer through willful blindness, ra-
ther than actual or constructive knowledge, undermines the pro-
tections offered to patentees by § 271(b). The ability of plaintiffs
to succeed in proving induced patent infringement is greatly dimi-
nished under the new standards established in Global-Tech.
Rather than clarifying the landscape of patent law, the Supreme
Court's decision in Global-Tech will instead sow confusion among
the patent bar. For example, as discussed above, willful direct
infringement under § 271(a) requires that an infringer acted de-
spite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted in-
fringement of a valid patent, where the risk of infringement was
either "known or so obvious that it should have been known."
151
This is, of course, very similar to the standard articulated by the
Federal Circuit in Manville that applied to induced infringement
prior to Global-Tech . The patent bar is now forced to question
whether that well-established standard will fall victim to the same
willful blindness analysis. Similarly, attorneys will now be forced
to question other seemingly well-settled areas of patent law where
intent plays a role in proving a cause of action.
5 3
C. The Resulting Erosion of the Credibility of the Federal Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established in
1982 to bring stability and predictability to patent law, which had
become badly fractured and divergent among the various circuit
courts of appeal.' The Federal Circuit was granted exclusive ju-
risdiction over appeals of patent cases from federal district courts
to allow a court to generate a single body of law for evaluating pa-
tent cases. 155 As the sole appellate circuit court charged with in-
terpretation of patent law, the Federal Circuit is responsible for
maintaining order and defining standards in this specialized area
of jurisprudence.
151. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47,
69 (2007)).
152. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553.
153. Examples include contributory infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010) and
inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863
F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
154. KIEFF, supra note 93, at 31 ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
established in 1982 in a bipartisan effort to bring certainty and stability to U.S. patent
law.").
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982). Portions of this statute not relevant here are im-
pacted by the recent revision of the Patent Act. America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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The Federal Circuit has largely obtained those goals set forth in
1982. As stated by the Honorable Gerald J. Mossinghof:" 6
"[alithough in no field of law as dynamic as patent law can there
be 100% assurance of the outcome of any case, business executives
and their counsel can now look to a coherent and consistent body
of case law to guide their fundamental research and development
decisions."157 The only way for that "coherent and consistent body
of case law" to be maintained is if that case law is treated with
appropriate respect by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is,
of course, under no obligation to follow the precedent of lower
courts. It has in the past, however, recognized the Federal Cir-
cuit's "sound judgment" in other areas of patent law, calling such
issues the "special expertise" of the court."'
It is unclear that the Supreme Court still holds the Federal Cir-
cuit in such high regard. The past decade has seen a continuing
trend of the Supreme Court reversing the Federal Circuit's deci-
sions and wholesale rejection of its analysis.19  The Global-Tech
opinion continues that trend. While the holding of the Federal
Circuit was affirmed, the Supreme Court once again rejected the
tests employed by that court. Moreover, both the majority and
dissenting opinions are notable in their disregard for Federal Cir-
cuit precedent. Neither opinion cites to a single Federal Circuit
case in evaluating the complex patent issues involved with assess-
ing induced infringement under § 271(b). The result is a pat-
chwork decision that is ungrounded in the relevant precedent and
instead imports inapposite criminal concepts into this complex
and highly specialized area of tort law. Needless to say, the Fed-
eral Circuit carefully evaluates the patent cases before it, tapping
into a wealth of expertise and experience grounded in the juri-
sprudence of patents. The Supreme Court's decision in Global-
156. Mr. Mossinghof is a former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks. KIEFF, supra note 93, at 31-32. He played an instrumental role
in establishing the Federal Circuit under the Reagan administration. Id.
157. Id.
158. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997) ("We
expect that the Federal Circuit will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the
orderly course of case-by-case determinations, and we leave such refinement to that court's
sound judgment in this area of its special expertise." (emphasis added)).
159. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (2007). See also Gregory A. Castanias et al., Survey of the Federal Circuit's
Patent Law Decisions in 2006: A New Chapter in the Ongoing Dialogue with the Supreme
Court, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 793, 808-14 (2007). Justice Scalia has even gone so far as to de-
scribe some of the Federal Circuit's standards as "gobbledygook" and "irrational." Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 41, KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (No. 04-1350).
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Tech continues the disturbing trend of eroding the relevance and
impact of the Federal Circuit by casting a willfully blind eye
across its considered and extensive precedent.
James G. Dilmore, Ph.D. *
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